In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategyproof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.
Introduction
Following the seminal work of Hurwicz (1972) , the manipulability and efficiency of allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies have been studied intensively. Zhou (1991) established that any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism is dictatorial in exchange economies with two agents having classical (i.e., continuous, strictly monotonic, and strictly convex) preferences. The dictatorship result in twoagent economies has been strengthened by being proven in the domain of restricted preferences. 1 Compared with the result in two-agent economies, it is an open question whether Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms can be characterized in economies with many agents. This is the issue that we examine in this paper. In manyagent economies, there actually exist Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and nondictatorial allocation mechanisms. Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) constructed such a mechanism, relying on the reverse dictator's preference, to select one agent among the remaining agents, who is allocated the total endowment. Kato and Ohseto (2002) constructed a mechanism in economies with four or more agents, such that all agents have the opportunity to be allocated the total endowment. A specific feature shared by all known Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms is that some single agent receives the whole amount of goods even if the receivers vary. Such a mechanism is called alternately dictatorial. The natural question to be asked is whether there exists a Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and nonalternately dictatorial allocation mechanism.
Takeshi Momi: tmomi@mail.doshisha.ac.jp In this paper, we show that in exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism is alternately dictatorial. We believe that our method and result provide a first step toward solving the general question without conditions on numbers of goods and agents.
In the following subsections, we discuss our method in detail and compare our result with those of related papers to highlight the contributions in this paper.
Approach
In this paper, we study what we call the option set in detail. An agent's option set, when the other agents' preferences are fixed, is defined as the union of the agent's consumption bundles allocated by a mechanism while his preference changes. Then the agent's consumption bundle allocated by a strategy-proof mechanism should be the most preferred one in the option set with respect to his preference. Therefore, the option set completely describes how the agent's consumption changes under a strategy-proof mechanism in response to changes in his preference when the other agents' preferences are fixed.
Note that the option set must be either the zero consumption bundle or the total endowment, under an alternately dictatorial mechanism. In this paper, we assume that a positive consumption bundle different from the total endowment is allocated by a mechanism, and we then study the agent's option set in a neighborhood of the consumption bundle. Through the analysis of the option set, we investigate how consumption changes in response to changes in the agent's preference, and we obtain allocations that contradict the Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness of the mechanism. This is the approach that Hashimoto (2008) and Momi (2013a Momi ( , 2013b followed to analyze two-agent economies. In two-agent economies, we can determine an agent's option set as the inverted image of an upper contour set of the other agent's preference. This easily yields the dictatorship result in two-agent economies. In economies with many agents, we cannot obtain the exact shape of the option set. However, we can still derive the topological properties of the option set. Roughly speaking, we show that in a neighborhood of an allocated consumption bundle that is neither zero nor the total endowment, the option set is the smooth surface of a strictly convex set. This property is sufficient to yield allocations that contradict Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness.
Throughout the paper, the condition that the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents plays an important role. In the core part of the paper, we deal with homothetic preferences and consider preferences that satisfy independence in the following sense. An efficient allocation given by a Pareto-efficient mechanism uniquely determines the supporting price, and the supporting price vector uniquely determines the direction of possible consumption of each agent with a homothetic preference. We refer to this direction vector as the consumption-direction vector of the agent. If these consumption-direction vectors are independent among agents, then there is a unique way to scale these vectors so that they sum up to the total endowment. That is, a supporting price induced by a Pareto-efficient mechanism determines the allocation itself when the consumption-direction vectors are independent. In other words, a consumption bundle of an agent uniquely determines the other agents' consumption bundles under independence of the consumption-direction vectors. This works in many-agent economies as in two-agent economies: an agent's consumption immediately determines the other agent's consumption as the rest of the goods, which makes two-agent economies decisively tractable. It is clear that we need at least as many goods as the number of agents for the existence of a preference profile satisfying the independence of the consumption-direction vectors.
Through the option set, we know how an agent's consumption changes in response to changes in his preference, as mentioned above. If the consumption-direction vectors are independent, this change of an agent's consumption exactly determine how other agents' consumption changes, that is, how the allocation itself changes. Using this, the proof in this paper proceeds as follows. We suppose that an agent is allocated consumption that is neither zero nor the total endowment. First, we establish that the agent's option set is the smooth surface of a strictly smooth set in a neighborhood of the consumption bundle. Then we observe that such an option set induces allocations that contradict the Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness. This implies that any agent's consumption is either zero or the total endowment; that is, the allocation is alternately dictatorial.
Related literature
As mentioned above, the general characterization of Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-agent economies is still an open problem.
Some studies show the incompatibility of Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness with allocation restrictions. Serizawa (2002) shows the incompatibility with the individual rationality restriction, where agents originally possess their initial endowments and a mechanism is assumed to allocate consumption that benefits all agents. Serizawa and Weymark (2003) show the incompatibility with the minimum consumption guarantee restriction, where the consumption of each agent is assumed to be away from zero by some minimum distance. Momi (2013b) shows the incompatibility with a simple positivity restriction, where a mechanism is assumed to allocate positive consumption to all agents. Alternatively, Barberà and Jackson (1995) discard Pareto efficiency and characterize strategy-proof mechanisms satisfying the individual rationality restriction. These allocation restrictions are so strong that they exclude any mechanism wherein some agents receive zero consumption. In particular, alternately dictatorial allocations violate these restrictions. Therefore, as long as there are at least as many goods as agents, the result in this paper, where Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness induce alternately dictatorial allocations, yields the above-mentioned results by Serizawa (2002) , Serizawa and Weymark (2003) , and Momi (2013b) as a corollary.
Some studies investigate the nonbossiness condition. A mechanism is called nonbossy if a change in the preference of an agent does not affect the allocation as long as it does not affect the agent's own consumption. Momi (2013b) shows that any Paretoefficient, strategy-proof, and nonbossy mechanism is dictatorial. Goswami et al. (2014) show that any Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, nonbossy, and continuous mechanism is dictatorial even in the restricted domain of quasi-linear preferences. See Hatfield (2009) for a study of Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and nonbossy mechanisms in the context of allocating indivisible goods. The nonbossiness condition almost immediately implies that an alternately dictatorial mechanism is dictatorial; that is, it excludes a mechanism where receivers of the total endowment vary. Therefore, as long as there are at least as many goods as agents, the above-mentioned result by Momi (2013b) is obtained as a corollary of this paper's result.
The characterization of Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms has been obtained not only for two-agent economies but also for three-agent economies. Momi (2013b) proves that any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism in three-agent economies is either dictatorial or of the Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) type. Unfortunately, this approach crucially relies on the assumption of three agents and it seems difficult to extend it to economies with more agents. Although Momi (2013b) studies the option set, he focuses on a preference profile where two out of three agents have the same preference. In such a case, these two agents can be identified, and the option set of the other agent is given by the turned-over image of an upper contour set of this preference, as in two-agent economies.
Alternatively, given the assumption on the numbers of agents and goods, the current paper's result does not cover the case of economies with three agents and two goods, which is covered by Momi (2013b) . However, it might be possible to extend our proof to cover this case. As mentioned in the previous subsection, and as is seen in the proof, what is crucial is that the consumption bundle of an agent uniquely determines the other agents' consumption. Suppose that the number of agents exceeds the number of goods by exactly 1. If the consumption bundle of an agent is determined, then the other agents' consumption should be determined uniquely under independence of their consumption-direction vectors because their total consumption equals the total endowment minus the predetermined consumption. However, such a slight extension is of minor importance. The interesting and challenging question is, of course, whether we can have a Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and nonalternately dictatorial allocation mechanism without any restrictions on the numbers of agents and goods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and results. Section 3 explains some technical aspects of the paper and demonstrates a technique for constructing a preference. Section 4 reveals the properties of the option set. Sections 5 and 6 provide the proofs of the results in Section 2. Section 7 provides concluding remarks. The Appendix contains proofs of all lemmas and propositions in Sections 3 and 4.
Model and results
We consider an economy with N agents, indexed by N = {1 N}, where N ≥ 2, and L goods, indexed by L = {1 L}, where L ≥ 2. The consumption set for each agent is R L + . A consumption bundle for agent i ∈ N is a vector
Thus, the set of feasible allocations for the economy with N agents and L goods is
A preference R is a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation on R L + . The corresponding strict preference P R and indifference I R are defined in the usual way. For any x and x in R L + , xP R x implies that xRx and not x Rx, and xI R x implies that xRx and x Rx. Given a preference R and a consumption bundle x ∈ R L + , the upper contour set of R at x is UC(x; R) = {x ∈ R L + : x Rx}, and the lower contour set of R at x is LC(x; R) = {x ∈ R L + : xRx }. We let I(x; R) = {x ∈ R L + : x I R x} denote the indifference set of R at x, and let P(x; R) = {x ∈ R L + : x P R x} denote the strictly preferred set of R at x. A preference R is continuous if UC(x; R) and LC(x; R) are both closed for any x ∈ R L + . A preference R is strictly convex on R L ++ if UC(x; R) is a strictly convex set in R L for any x ∈ R L ++ . A preference R is monotonic if, for any x and x in R L + , x > x implies that xRx . 2 A preference R is strictly monotonic on R L ++ if, for any x and x in R L ++ , x > x implies that xP R x . 3 A preference R is homothetic if, for any x and x in R L + and any t > 0, xRx implies that (tx)R(tx ). A preference R is smooth if for any x ∈ R L ++ , there exists a unique vector p ∈ S L−1 + ≡ {x ∈ R L + : x = 1} such that p is the normal of a supporting hyperplane to UC(x; R) at x. We call the vector p the gradient vector of R at x, and write p = p(R x). Note that if R is smooth, strictly convex on R L ++ , and strictly monotonic on R L ++ , then the gradient vector is positive in the positive orthant:
++ : x = 1} for any x ∈ R L ++ . We call a preference classical when it is continuous, strictly convex on R L ++ , and strictly monotonic on R L ++ , and we let R C denote the set of classical preferences. Furthermore, we let R denote the set of classical, smooth, and homothetic preferences. In this paper, we prove the results in the restricted domain R and then extend them to R C .
A preference profile is an N-tuple R = (R 1 R N ) ∈ R N . We write the subprofile obtained by removing R i from R as R −i = (R 1 R i−1 R i+1 R N ) and write the pro-
We also write R −{i j} to denote the subprofile obtained by removing R i and R j from R.
A social choice function f : R N → X assigns a feasible allocation to each preference profile in R N . For a preference profile R ∈ R N , the outcome chosen can be written as
, where f i (R) is the consumption bundle allocated to agent i by f . Definition 1. A social choice function f : R N → X is strategy-proof if f i (R)R i f i (R i R −i ) for any i ∈ N, any R ∈ R N , and anyR i ∈ R.
A feasible allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible allocation that benefits someone without making anyone else worse off. That is, x ∈ X is Pareto efficient 2 For vectors x and x in R L , x > x denotes that x l ≥ x l for any l ∈ L and x = x . 3 Therefore, if R is continuous, strictly convex on R L ++ , and strictly monotonic on R L ++ , then UC(x; R) ⊂ R L ++ for any x ∈ R L ++ and the boundary ∂R L + is an indifference set.
for preference profile R if there exists nox ∈ X such thatx i R i x i for any i ∈ N andx j P R j x j for some j ∈ N. We say that a social choice function is Pareto efficient if it always assigns a Pareto-efficient allocation.
We say that a social choice function is dictatorial if there exists an agent who is always allocated the total endowment. Definition 3. A social choice function f : R N → X is dictatorial if there exists i ∈ N such that f i (R) = for any R ∈ R N .
We say that a social choice function is alternately dictatorial if it always allocates the total endowment to some single agent. Note that under an alternately dictatorial social choice function, the identity of the receiver of the total endowment may vary depending on preference profiles.
This paper's main result is as follows.
Theorem. When L ≥ N, a Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof social choice function f :
This is proved in the preference domain R. LetR be a preference domain such that R ⊂R ⊂ R C , and let us extend Definitions 1-4 toR.
Corollary. When L ≥ N, a Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof social choice function f :R N → X is alternately dictatorial.
Preliminary results
In this section, we explain some technical aspects of this paper. We introduce a metric in the space of preferences and show a technique of preference construction. Furthermore, we define the pseudo-efficiency of a social choice function and the feasible consumption set for an agent.
As in the previous works, including Serizawa (2002) and Momi (2013b) , we introduce the Kannai metric into R following Kannai (1970) , to discuss the continuity in R. For x ∈ R L + \ 0, we let [x] denote the ray starting from zero and passing through x:
Using these definitions, the Kannai metric d(R R ) for continuous and monotonic preferences R and R is defined as
where · denotes the Euclidean norm in R L . With the Kannai metric, R is a metric space. See Kannai (1970) for details.
We often discuss the distance between upper contour sets of preferences. Note that any homothetic preference is identified by one indifference set or upper contour set in R L ++ because the other indifference sets of the homothetic preference are determined by similarity transformations. For any subsets A and B in R L , we write A + B = {a + b ∈ R L : a ∈ A b ∈ B} and A − B = {a − b ∈ R L : a ∈ A b ∈ B}. We call a subset A ⊂ R L ++ monotonic when x + R L + ⊂ A holds for any x ∈ A, and we define M as the set of closed and monotonic subsets of R L ++ . For any A ∈ M, the homothetic, continuous, and monotonic preference R A that has A as its upper contour set is uniquely determined. We define the distance d M (A B) between A and B in M as
Thus, the convergence of candidate upper contour sets with respect to this metric implies the convergence of the corresponding preferences with respect to the Kannai metric. 4 In this paper, we use B (R) ⊂ R to denote the open ball set of preferences in R, with centerR and radius > 0: B (R) = {R ∈ R : d(R R ) < }. We use B ⊂ R to denote an open ball set of preferences without a specified center or radius, For a preference R ∈ R and a consumption bundle x ∈ R L + , a preferenceR is called a Maskin monotonic transformation (MMT, hereafter) of R at x ifx ∈ UC(x;R) andx = x implies thatxP R x. It is well known that if an agent receives x at a preference profile R, strategy-proofness implies that this agent receives the same consumption bundle x when his preference is subject to an MMT at x. As shown in Momi (2013b, Lemma 4) , for a preference R ∈ R and a consumption bundle x ∈ R L ++ , there exists a preference that is an MMT of R at x in any neighborhood of R.
For a price vector p ∈ S L−1 ++ and a consumption vector x ∈ R L ++ , we let p ⊥ denote the hyperplane perpendicular to p, i.e., p ⊥ = {y ∈ R L : py = 0}, and let H(x; p) denote the upper right-hand side half-space of the hyperplane, i.e., H(x; p) = y + p ⊥ + R L + . Now, we demonstrate a technique for constructing a preference that satisfies a given pair of a gradient vector and a consumption bundle in a neighborhood of a given preference. LetR ∈ R be a preference that has a gradient vectorp ∈ S L−1 ++ at a consumption bundlex ∈ R L ++ , as drawn in Figure 1 . We let (x n p n ) be another pair consisting of a consumption bundle and a price vector, and construct a preference R n that has p n as the gradient vector at x n . This n in x n should not be confused with the subscripts labeling goods. It is not difficult to imagine such a preference R n in a neighborhood ofR if 4 Note the difference between the Kannai metric for preferences and the Hausdorff metric for the corresponding indifference or upper contour sets. Fix a consumption vector x. the convergence R → R * with respect to the Kannai metric does not generally imply convergence I(x; R) → I(x; R * ) with respect to the Hausdorff metric because the indifference sets are not bounded. For example, let P ⊂ S L−1 ++ be a compact set and let K = z∈P [z] denote the union of rays [z] passing through z ∈ P. Then I(x; R) ∩ K is compact and the convergence R → R * implies the convergence I(x; R) ∩ K → I(x; R * ) ∩ K with respect to the Hausdorff metric. Alternatively, the convergence of candidate indifference or upper contour sets with respect to the Hausdorff metric implies the convergence of the corresponding preferences with respect to the Kannai metric. p n and x n are sufficiently close top andx, respectively. Furthermore, we can have the preference R n so that its gradient vector atx isp if p nx > p n ([x n ] ∩ I(x;R)), as drawn in Figure 1 . To understand this condition, consider another price vector p such that p x ≤ p ([x n ] ∩ I(x;R)), as drawn in the figure. It is clear that any strictly convex preference with the gradient vector p at x n cannot havep as its gradient vector atx. This is summarized as Lemma 1. Note that the condition p n ([x]∩I(x n ;R)) > p n x n in the lemma is equivalent to the above-mentioned p nx > p n ([x n ] ∩ I(x;R)), because the preferencē R is homothetic. See the Appendix for the proof of Lemma 1.
. Let {x n } ∞ n=1 and {p n } ∞ n=1 be sequences of consumption bundles and price vectors that converge tox andp, respectively: x n →x and p n →p as n → ∞. For any > 0, there existsn such that for any n >n there exists a preference R n ∈ B (R) such that p(R n x n ) = p n . Furthermore, if p n ([x] ∩ I(x n ;R)) > p n x n holds for n >n, we can have R n ∈ B (R) satisfying p(R n x) =p in addition to p(R n x n ) = p n .
We say that a social choice function is pseudo-efficient if it allocates a Paretoefficient allocation or allocates zero consumption to all agents.
It is clear that if a social choice function is Pareto efficient, then it is also pseudoefficient. Until the last step in the proof of the theorem provided in Section 6, we prove all lemmas and propositions with a pseudo-efficient social choice function rather than with a Pareto-efficient social choice function. This is because, in the proof of the theorem, we apply the lemmas and propositions to a subeconomy N ⊂ N with N (< N) agents. Note that pseudo-efficiency in such a subeconomy does not contradict Pareto efficiency in the whole economy. Let a social choice function f be Pareto efficient in the whole economy N. If f allocates the entire amount of goods to members of a subeconomy N ⊂ N or to agents outside the subeconomy, then the social choice function f restricted to the subeconomy N is pseudo-efficient.
Furthermore, in most parts of the proofs in this paper, we deal with a social choice function that only locally satisfies efficiency and strategy-proofness. As mentioned above, B ⊂ R denotes an open ball set of preferences. We write B i to clarify that it is a set of agent i's preferences and we write B = N i=1 B i to denote the product of such open ball sets over agents. We say that a social choice function is strategy-proof on B if f i (R)R i f i (R i R −i ) for any i ∈ N, any R ∈ B, and anyR i ∈ B i . We say that a social choice function f is Pareto efficient on B if f (R) is Pareto efficient for any R ∈ B. We say that a social choice function f is pseudo-efficient on B if, for any R ∈ B, f (R) is Pareto efficient or f i (R) = 0 for any i ∈ N.
We let A denote the feasible consumption set for an agent:
It is not difficult to observe that if a social choice function is pseudo-efficient on B, then for any R ∈ B, any agent's consumption f i (R) is not on the boundary of A except zero and ; that is, f i (R) ∈ int A ∪ {0 } for any i and any R ∈ B, where int A denotes the interior of A. We first observe that f i (R) cannot be on the boundary of the consumption set, ∂R L + , except for the zero vector. Suppose f i (R) ∈ ∂R L + \ 0 for an agent i. If there exists another agent j who receives consumption in the interior of the consumption set, then reallocating f i (R) to agent j makes agent j better off without worsening agent i because the boundary of the consumption set is an indifferent set, and agent i is indifferent between zero consumption and any consumption on the boundary. This contradicts the pseudoefficiency of f . If there exists no agent who receives consumption in the interior of the consumption set, then reallocating the total amount of goods to some agent j makes agent j better off without negatively impacting any other agent, for the same reason. This contradicts the pseudo-efficiency of f . Therefore,
l (R) = l for some good l and f i (R) = for an agent i, then there exists another agent j such that f j (R) ∈ ∂R L + \ 0, which is a contradiction, as shown above. Therefore, f i l (R) = l for any l, except for the case where f i (R) = . Thus, we have f i (R) ∈ int A ∪ {0 } for any i and any R ∈ B.
Option set
In this section, we study the option set and show that it is the smooth surface of a strictly convex set in a neighborhood of a consumption bundle in the interior of the feasible consumption set.
We consider a social choice function f that is pseudo-efficient and strategy-proof on a product set B = N i=1 B i . The option set is defined as follows. For agent i, when the other agents' preferences R −i ∈ B −i ≡ j =i B j are fixed, we define the option set,
+ , as the union of the agent's consumption bundles given by f over his preferences in B i :
The fact that we omit the domain B i in the notation of G i (R −i ) should not cause any confusion. We are interested in the option set in a neighborhood of a specific consumption bundle f i (R), and the option set around the consumption bundle does not depend on the domain B as long as it includes the preference profile R.
Because of the strategy-proofness on B, f i (R i R −i ) should be the most preferred consumption bundle in G i (R −i ) with respect to R i ∈ B i . In two trivial cases, G i (R −i ) is given by single-element sets because of strategy-proofness. If
Note that these are the cases that occur under an alternately dictatorial social choice function. As mentioned in Section 3, f i (R) ∈ int A ∪ {0 } for any i and any R ∈ B. Going forward, we investigate the case where f i (R i R −i ) ∈ int A for an agent i and any R i ∈ B i . Note that as long as f i (R i R −i ) ∈ int A, the allocation f (R i R −i ) is Pareto efficient under the pseudo-efficiency of f on B.
To study the option set, independence of the preferences is required in the following sense. At a Pareto-efficient allocation f (R), all agents share the same gradient vector at their consumption as long as consumption is positive and the gradient vector is well defined. We call this vector the price vector at allocation f (R) and write p(R f ) ∈ S L−1 ++ . Alternatively, for a preference R ∈ R and a price vector p ∈ S L−1 ++ , we let g(R p) ∈ S L−1 ++ denote the normalized consumption vector where the gradient vector of R is p. Note that the normalized consumption vector is a continuous function of p because preference R is smooth and strictly convex in R L ++ . Therefore, if normalized consumption vectors g(R i p), i = 1 N, are linearly independent at p =p, the linear independence also holds in a small neighborhood ofp.
As mentioned above, the price vector depends on the social choice function: p = p(R f ). We call g(R i p(R f )) agent i's consumption-direction vector at the preference profile R under f because his consumption f i (R) should be on the ray
We focus on a preference profileR ∈ B such that the consumption-direction vectors are independent. The role of this independence should be clear. As consumption vectors f i (R), i = 1 N, are on the rays [g(R i p(R f ))], i = 1 N, respectively, and they sum to the total endowment , the consumption vectors should be determined uniquely if the consumption-direction vectors are independent. Note that we need L ≥ N for the independence to hold.
The rest of this section discusses the topological properties of the option set when an agent i receives a consumption bundle in the interior of the feasible consumption set: f i (R) ∈ int A. As a result, we see that in a neighborhood of f i (R), the option set G i (R −i ) is the L − 1-dimensional smooth surface of a strictly convex set, as drawn in Figure 2 .
Keep in mind that such an L − 1-dimensional option set is obtained under the assumption that f i (R) ∈ int A. In the next section, we observe that such an option set induces allocations incompatible with the Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness of the social choice function to prove the alternately dictatorial result.
The next lemma is an immediate consequence of the independence of the consumption-direction vectors. Recall that the proofs of all lemmas and propositions in this section are provided in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. Suppose that a social choice function f is pseudo-efficient on a product set of open balls
As mentioned, f i (R) is the most preferred consumption bundle in the option set G i (R −i ) with respect to R i ∈ B i . We want to establish the reverse: the most preferred consumption bundle in G i (R −i ) with respect to R i ∈ B i is the consumption bundle allocated to agent i by the social choice function when his preference is R i . For tractability, we initially consider the most preferred consumption bundle in the option set's closure, G i (R −i ). By considering the closure, we ensure the existence of the most preferred consumption vector in G i (R −i ) with respect to any preference R i .
Lemma 3 shows that if a consumption bundle is the most preferred in the closure of the option set with respect to some preference, then the consumption bundle is actually an element of the option set.
Lemma 3. Suppose that a social choice function f is pseudo-efficient and strategy-proof on a product set of open balls
An immediate consequence of Lemma 3 is that if x is the unique, most preferred consumption bundle in G i (R −i ) with respect to R i ∈ B i , then x = f i (R). The next lemma proves that the most preferred consumption bundle is actually unique. Thus, for any preference R i ∈ B i , the most preferred consumption bundle in G i (R −i ) with respect to the preference is unique, and it is exactly the consumption bundle f i (R) allocated to the agent for the preference by the social choice function f .
Lemma 4. We let f be a social choice function that is pseudo-efficient and strategy-proof on a product set of open balls
As a consequence of Lemma 4, the next proposition shows that f (· R −i ) is a continuous function of R i in a neighborhood ofR i .
Proposition 1. We let f be a social choice function that is pseudo-efficient and strategyproof on a product set of open balls
Next, we show that G i (R −i ) is the surface of a convex set in the sense that in a neighborhood of f i (R), G i (R −i ) is in the lower left-hand side of the hyperplane
Proposition 2. We let f be a social choice function that is pseudo-efficient and strategyproof on a product set of open balls
; that is, there exist positive scalars and such that
This proposition asserts the convexity of the option set in the following sense. For
with s ∈ (0 1) has an intersection with G i (R −i ), then the intersection is written as t(sx +(1−s)x ) with a scalar t ≥ 1 greater than or equal to 1. If the intersection is given as t(sx + (1 − s)x ) with t < 1, then there exists R i such that f i (R i R −i ) is arbitrarily close to the intersection because of the definition of G i (R −i ). Then at least one of x and x is in the upper righthand side of the hyperplane f i (R i R −i ) + p((R i R −i ) f )) ⊥ regardless of the value of the price vector, which contradicts Proposition 2.
Next, we show that G i (R −i ) is a surface of a strictly convex set; that is, the t in the previous paragraph is strictly greater than 1. In other words, for any R i in a neighbor-
Proposition 3. We let f be a social choice function that is pseudo-efficient and strategyproof on a product set of open balls
The next proposition shows that G i (R −i ) is a smooth surface in the sense that at each point f i (R i R −i ), the hyperplane tangent to G i (R −i ) is unique.
Proposition 4. We let f be a social choice function that is pseudo-efficient and strategyproof on a product set of open balls
Finally, we show that G i (R −i ) coincides with G i (R −i ) and that it is an L − 1-dimensional manifold in a neighborhood of the consumption bundle f i (R) ∈ int A, where the consumption-direction vectors are independent.
Proposition 5. We let f be a social choice function that is pseudo-efficient and strategyproof on a product set of open balls
B = N i=1 B i . We suppose that g(R i p(R f )), i = 1 N, are independent at a preference profileR = (R 1 R N ) ∈ B and that f i (R) ∈ int A for an agent i. In a neighborhood of f i (R), G i (R −i ) coincides with G i (R −i ) and it is an L − 1-dimensional manifold.
Proof of Theorem
In the previous section, we showed that given the assumption that an agent is allocated positive consumption in the interior of the feasible consumption set, the agent's option set is the L − 1-dimensional smooth surface of a strictly convex set in a neighborhood of the consumption bundle. In this section, we observe that such an option set induces allocations that are incompatible with the Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness of the social choice function. This implies that any agent should be allocated zero consumption or the total endowment. In the next proposition, we show that if a social choice function satisfies pseudoefficiency and strategy-proofness locally in a neighborhood of a preference profile where the consumption-direction vectors are independent, then any agent receives zero consumption or the total endowment at the preference profile. 
Proposition 6. We let f be a social choice function that is pseudo-efficient and strategyproof on a product set of open balls
Proof. We let f be a social choice function that is pseudo-efficient and strategy-
As shown in Section 3, f i (R) ∈ int A ∪ {0 } for any i ∈ N. We assume that there exists an agent who receives consumption in int A atR, and show a contradiction.
As f is pseudo-efficient on B, if an agent receives consumption in int A atR, there exists another agent who also receives consumption in int A. Without loss of generality, we assume that agents 1 and 2 are such agents:
x N ) and p(R f ) =p. Because of the independence of the consumption-direction vectors, the results in the previous section hold for agents 1 and 2: in a neighborhood of their consumption bundles, each of their option sets is the L − 1-dimensional smooth surface of a strictly convex set, as drawn in Figure 2 .
We letR 2 ∈ B 2 be an MMT ofR 2 atx 2 such thatR 2 andR 2 have the same gradient vector only at consumption on the ray [x 2 ]. For example, see Momi (2013b, Lemma 4) for the construction of such an MMT in any neighborhood ofR 2 . Then f (R 2 R −2 ) =x as in Lemma 2. Figure 3 describes agent 2's preferencesR 2 andR 2 and the corresponding agent 1's option sets. In the following proof, we observe that these induce allocations that contradict strategy-proofness with respect to agent 1. Now, we focus on the option sets G 1 (R −1 ) and G 1 (R 2 R −{1 2} ). As f (R) = f (R 2 R −2 ) =x, both of these option sets are tangent to the hyperplanex 1 +p ⊥ atx 1 . We ob-
for any R 1 in a neighborhood ofR 1 unless the gradient vector of R 1 at x 1 isp. If these price vectors coincide, then the hyperplanes tangent to the option set G 2 (R 1 R −{1 2} ) at agent 2's two consumption bundles, f 2 (R 1 R 2 R −{1 2} ) and f 2 (R 1 R 2 R −{1 2} ), have the same normal vector. This contradicts the strict convexity of the option set shown in Proposition 3 because these two consumption bundles of agent 2 do not coincide by our choice ofR 2 .
For a price vector p ∈ S L−1 ++ in a neighborhood ofp, we letȳ(p) denote the point on G 1 (R −1 ) such thatȳ(p) + p ⊥ is the hyperplane tangent to G 1 (R −1 ) atȳ(p), and we let y(p) denote the point on G 1 (R 2 R −{1 2} ) such thatỹ(p) + p ⊥ is the hyperplane tangent to G 1 (R 2 R −{1 2} ) atỹ(p). Because of Propositions 1-5 in the previous section,ỹ(p) and y(p) are determined uniquely for any p in a neighborhood ofp. Note that we can pick a price vector p in any neighborhood ofp such that the hyperplanesȳ(p) + p ⊥ andỹ(p) + p ⊥ are different. The existence of such a p should be clear because nonexistence of such a p in a neighborhood ofp implies the coincidence of G 1 (R −1 ) and G 1 (R 2 R −{1 2} ) in a neighborhood ofx 1 , which contradicts the discussion in the previous paragraph. Thus, we let {p n } ∞ n=1 be a sequence of price vectors converging top:
For each sufficiently large n, we pick agent 1's preferences, R 1 n and R 1 n in B 1 , satisfying the following conditions: (i) the gradient vector of
For example, such preferences can be obtained as follows. As the hyperplanes
Here, we assume the former, as drawn in Figure 3 , and construct R 1 n and R 1 n satisfyingȳ(p n ) ∈ P(ỹ(p n ); R 1 n ). A symmetric discussion can be applied for the other case. To obtain R 1 n ∈ B 1 satisfying (i), we directly apply the preference construction in Lemma 1 so thatR, (x p), and (x n p n ) in Lemma 1 correspond toR 1 , (x 1 p), and (ȳ(p n ) p n ), respectively, in the present setup. Asȳ(p n ) and p n converge tox 1 andp, respectively, as n → ∞, R 1 n converges toR 1 , as shown in Lemma 1, and hence R 1 n is in B 1 for a sufficiently large n.
Alternatively, R 1 n ∈ B 1 satisfying (ii) and (iii) is obtained as follows. If n satisfies y(p n ) ∈ P(ỹ(p n );R 1 ), we construct R 1 n in a neighborhood ofR 1 satisfying (ii) by directly applying the preference construction in the first part of Lemma 1 so thatR, (x p), and (x n p n ) in Lemma 1 correspond toR 1 , (x 1 p), and (ỹ(p n ) p n ), respectively, in the present setup. Asỹ(p n ) and p n converge tox 1 andp, respectively, as n → ∞, R 1 n converges toR 1 , as shown in Lemma 1, and hence R 1 n is in B 1 for a sufficiently large n. If y(p n ) ∈ P(ỹ(p n );R 1 ), then (iii) is satisfied with R 1 n when n is sufficiently large because R 1 n is then sufficiently close toR 1 . Even if n satisfiesȳ(p n ) / ∈ P(ỹ(p n );R 1 ), we construct R 1 n as we did in the proof of Lemma 1. We let n be a scalar smaller than the distance between the hyperplanes y(p n ) + p ⊥ n andỹ(p n ) + p ⊥ n , and define E n as the upper contour set ofR 1 atȳ(p n ) − n p n cut off by the hyperplaneȳ(p n ) + (p n ) ⊥ : E n = UC(ȳ(p n ) − n p n ;R 1 ) ∩ H(ȳ(p n ); p n ). Then we consider a preference R 1 such that R 1 has the gradient vector p n atỹ(p n ) and the strictly preferred set atỹ(p n ) includes E n : E n ⊂ P(ỹ(p n ); R 1 ). The existence of such a preference R 1 is clear because the set E n is in the upper right-hand side of the hyperplaneỹ(p n ) + (p n ) ⊥ and away from the hyperplane. Then we define F n as the intersection of the upper contour set of R 1 atỹ(p n ) and that ofR 1 atȳ(p n ) − n p n :
is in the interior of F n . This F n cannot be an upper contour set of a smooth preference because it has the edge at the intersection I(ỹ(p n ); R 1 ) ∩ I(ȳ(p n ) − n p n ;R 1 ).
We let n be a scalar smaller than the distance betweenȳ(p n ) and the boundary of F n . Using this n , we round the edge of F n as in Lemma 6 and let R 1 n be the preference whose upper contour set is the smoothed set. That is, we letD n ⊂ R L + denote a closed ball with radius n and define a closed set C n as the union of such closed balls with radius n included in F n . That is, C n = D n ⊂F nD n . We defineR 1 n as the preference such that it has C n as an upper contour set. It is clear from the construction thatỹ(p n ) + (p n ) ⊥ is the supporting hyperplane of C n atỹ(p n ) and thatȳ(p n ) is in the interior of C n , and hence, R 1 n satisfies (ii) and (iii). To observe that R 1 n is in B 1 for a sufficiently large n, note that the set F n converges to UC(x 1 ;R 1 ) as n → ∞. As n → ∞, the scalar n we used to round the edge of F n converges to 0. Thus R 1 n converges toR 1 as n → ∞.
n and x i n should not be confused with the subscripts labeling goods. It is clear that x 1 n =ȳ(p n ) and x 1 n =ỹ(p n ). We now focus on agent 2's preferences. Note that x 2 n is the most preferred consumption bundle in G 2 (R 1 n R −{1 2} ) with respect toR 2 , and the gradient vector ofR 2 at x 2 n is p n . Furthermore, x 2 n is the most preferred consumption bundle in
with respect toR 2 , and the gradient vector ofR 2 at x 2 n is p n . A strictly convex preference cannot have the same gradient vector p n at both consumption bundles x 2 n and x 2 n . We show that for a sufficiently large n, we have agent 2's preference in B 2 such that the gradient vector at x 2 n is p n and the gradient vector at x 2 n is arbitrarily close to p n . For example, such a preference can be obtained as follows. We let D be a closed ball with a small radius tangent to the hyperplane x 2 n + p ⊥ n at x 2 n in the upper right-hand side of the hyperplane such that D \ x 2 n is included in P(x 2 n ;R 2 ). Then we consider the intersection of the ray [x 2 n ] and the hyperplane x 2 n + p ⊥ n , and we letD be the closed ball with the same radius as D tangent to the hyperplane x 2 n + p ⊥ n at the intersection in the upper right-hand side of the hyperplane, as drawn in Figure 3 .
We now define K n as the convex hull of UC(x 2 n ;R 2 ) ∪D: K n = co(UC(x 2 n ;R 2 ) ∪D). The convex hull K n cannot be an upper contour set of a preference because it is not strictly convex. We construct a preference by Lemma 5. We fix any positive unit vector a ∈ S L−1 ++ and consider the L − 1-dimensional linear space a ⊥ . For y ∈ a ⊥ , we let L(y) denote the half-line starting from y and extending in the direction of the vector a: L(y) = {x ∈ R L |x = y + ta t ≥ 0}. We let 0 < s < 1 be a scalar and defineR 2 n s as the preference that has the following as an indifference set:
From the construction, the gradient vector ofR 2 n s at x 2 n is p n and the gradient vector at x 2 n converges to p n as s converges to 1. We observe thatR 2 n s ∈ B 2 for any s ∈ (0 1) when n is sufficiently large. As n → ∞, p n converges top, and both x 1 n and x 1 n converge to x 1 . Hence, both x 2 n and x 2 n converge tox 2 . Therefore, as n → ∞, x 2 n becomes closer to x 2 n and the intersection of [x 2 n ] and the hyperplane x 2 n + p ⊥ n also becomes closer to x 2 n . Then the set K n in the above construction becomes closer to the upper contour set UC(x 2 n ;R 2 ) of the preferenceR 2 . That is, the preferenceR 2 n s becomes closer toR 2 . Now, we set a sufficiently large n so that R 1 n R 1 n ∈ B 1 andR 2 n s ∈ B 2 for any s ∈ (0 1).
n s x N n s ), and we show that these allocations contradict the strategy-proofness of the social choice function when s is sufficiently close to 1.
Alternatively, as the preferenceR 2 n s has the gradient vector p n at x 2 n , the most preferred consumption in G 2 (R 1 n R −{1 2} ) with respect toR 2 n s is x 2 n . Thereforex n s = x n , as shown in Lemma 2. In particular,x 1 n s = x 1 n =ȳ(p n ) Alternatively, the gradient vector ofR 2 n s at x 2 n converges to p n as s → 1 as shown above. Therefore, as s → 1, the most preferred consumption bundle in G 2 (R 1 n R −{1 2} ) with respect toR 2 n s converges to x 2 n . Thenx n s converges to x n . In particular,x 1 n s converges to x 1 n =ỹ(p n ) as s → 1. As R 1 n and R 1 n satisfy (iii), this implies thatx 1 n s ∈ P(x 1 n s ; R 1 n ) orx 1 n s ∈ P(x 1 n s ; R 1 n ) for a value of s sufficiently close to 1. This contradicts the strategy-proofness of f on B with respect to agent 1 becausex 1 n s andx 1 n s are consumption bundles allocated to agent 1 for his preferences R 1 n and R 1 n , respectively, when the other agents' preferences are (R 2 n s R −{1 2} ).
As a preparatory step in proving the theorem, we let R * = (R 1 * R N * ) be a preference profile such that the consumption directions g(R i * p), i = 1 N, are independent for any price vector p ∈ S L−1 ++ . For example, let R i * , i = 1 N, be the preferences represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions
, and the consumption directions are independent with any price vector.
We show that for any preference profile in a neighborhood of R * , the consumptiondirection vectors are independent at any Pareto-efficient allocation. For a scalar ≥ 0, we let P = {p ∈ S L−1 ++ : = N i=1 t i g(R i p) where t i ≥ 0 R i ∈ B (R i * ) i ∈ N} denote the set of price vectors at the possible Pareto-efficient allocations, with preferences R i in the -neighborhoods of R i * , i = 1 N. Note that the closure of P , i.e., P , is away from the boundary ∂S L−1 ++ when is sufficiently small because P converges to P 0 as → 0 and because P 0 , the set of price vectors at possible Pareto-efficient allocations with R i * , i ∈ N, is away from the boundary. We fix a scalar > 0 so that P ⊂ S L−1 ++ . For any fixed price vector p, the consumption direction vector g(R i p) converges to g(R i * p) as R i converges to R i * with respect to the Kannia metric. Therefore, we let > 0 be a sufficiently small scalar such that g(R i p), i = 1 N, are independent for any R i ∈ B (R i * ), i = 1 N, and any p ∈ P . We defineˆ = min{ }. Thus, for any preferences R i in Bˆ (R i * ), i = 1 N, the consumption directions g(R i p), i = 1 N, are independent with any price vector at the possible Pareto-efficient allocations with such preferences.
We now prove the theorem. We suppose that a social choice function f is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof on the whole domain R N . As mentioned in Section 3,
and any R ∈ R N . We assume that an agent receives consumption in int A at some preference profileR ∈ R N (where the consumption-direction vectors are not independent). We show a contradiction.
We repeat the replacement of the preferences of agents who receive consumption in int A as follows. We define¯ =ˆ /N.
Step 1. We first pick an agent i 1 who receives consumption in int A atR. We replace his preference with R i 1 * . Let R = (R 1 R N ) denote the new preference profile after this replacement: R i 1 = R i 1 * and R i =R i for i = i 1 .
Agent i 1 's consumption at R is neither 0 nor because of the strategy-proofness of f . Therefore, there exists another agent i 2 who also receives consumption in int A at R because of the Pareto efficiency of f . We replace agent i 2 's preference with R i 2 * and let R denote the profile after this replacement. Note that agent i 2 's consumption at R is neither 0 nor because of the strategy-proofness.
Then we consider the replacement ofR i 1 andR i 2 with any R i 1 ∈ B¯ (R i 1 * ) and any R i 2 ∈ B¯ (R i 2 * ), respectively. As a result of this replacement, there should exist a prefer-
any agents other than i 1 and i 2 , and there exists a third agent i 3 other than i 1 and i 2 who receives consumption in int A atR . If such a preference profile does not exist, then let f be the social choice function f restricted to agents i 1 and i 2 , with other agents' preferences fixed toR i , i / ∈ {i 1 i 2 }. Then f is a social choice function in the two-agent economy of agents i 1 and i 2 that is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof on B¯ (R i 1 * ) × B¯ (R i 2 * ) and that allocates consumption in int A to both agents at (R i 1 * R i 2 * ). This contradicts Proposition 6.
Step 2. Now we replace agent i 3 's preference with R i 3 * . Let R = (R 1 R N ) denote the preference profile after this replacement: R i 1 =R i 1 , R i 2 =R i 2 , R i 3 = R i 3 * , and R i =R i for i / ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 }. Note that agent i 3 's consumption at R is neither 0 nor because of the strategy-proofness.
Then we consider the replacement of R i 1 , R i 2 , and R i 3 with any R i 1 ∈ B¯ (R i 1 ), R i 2 ∈ B¯ (R i 2 ), and R i 3 ∈ B¯ (R i 3 ), respectively. As a result, there should exist a preference profileR = (R 1 R N ) whereR i ∈ B i¯ (R i ) for i ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 },R i =R i for i / ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 }, and there exists a fourth agent i 4 / ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 } who receives consumption in int A atR .
If such a preference profile does not exist, then let f be the social choice function f restricted to agents i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 with other agents' preferences fixed toR i , i / ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 }. Then f is a social choice function in the three-agent economy of agents i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 that is pseudo-efficient and strategy-proof on B¯ (R i 1 ) × B¯ (R i 2 ) × B¯ (R i 3 ) and that allocates consumption in int A to at least two agents at the preference profile (R i 1 R i 2 R i 3 ). 5 Furthermore, R was obtained as a result of the replacement in the previous step and the replacement of agent i 3 's preference: R i =R i ∈ 5 For example, suppose that f i 1 (R ) ∈ int A, f i 2 (R ) = 0, f i 3 (R ) ∈ int A, and f i (R ) = 0 for i / ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 }. Then the agents i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 may receive zero consumption without violating the strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency of the social choice function f when agent i 2 's preference is replaced. To deal with this case, we proved the lemmas and propositions with a pseudo-efficient social choice function.
B i¯ (R i * ) for i ∈ {i 1 i 2 } and R i 3 = R i 3 * . Therefore, R i ∈ B¯ (R i * ) ⊂ Bˆ (B i * ) for any i ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 }. The consumption-direction vectors of these three agents are independent at (R i 1 R i 2 R i 3 ). This contradicts Proposition 6.
Step 3. We repeat the process. We replace agent i 4 's preference with R i 4 * . Let R = (R 1 R N ) denote the preference profile after this replacement: R i =R i for i ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 }, R i 4 = R i 4 * , and R i =R i for i / ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 }. Note that agent i 4 's consumption at R is neither 0 nor because of the strategy-proofness.
Then we consider the replacement of the preferences of these agents i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , and i 4 with any preferences in the¯ -neighborhoods B¯ (R i ) of R i , i ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 }, respectively. As a result, there should exist a preference profileR = (R 1 R N ) wherẽ
, and there exists a fifth agent i 5 / ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 } who receives positive consumption in int A atR . If such a preference profile does not exist, then let f be the social choice function f restricted to agents i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , and i 4 , with other agents' preferences fixed toR i , i / ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 }. Then f is a social choice function in the four-agent economy of agents i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , and i 4 that is pseudo-efficient and strategy-proof on B¯ (R i 1 ) × B¯ (R i 2 ) × B¯ (R i 3 ) × B¯ (R i 4 ) and that allocates consumption in int A to at least two agents at the preference profile (R i 1 R i 2 R i 3 R i 4 ). Furthermore, R was obtained as a result of the replacement in the previous step and the replacement of agent i 4 's preference: R i =R i ∈ B i¯ (R i ) for i ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 } and R i 4 = R i 4 * . Combined with the result R i ∈ B¯ (R i * ) for any i ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 } in the previous step, we have R i ∈ B 2¯ (R i * ) ⊂ Bˆ (R i * ) for any i ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 }. Therefore, the consumption-direction vectors of these four agents are independent at (R i 1 R i 2 R i 3 R i 4 ). This contradicts Proposition 6.
We repeat the process until Step N − 2. In Step k (≤ N − 2), we replace agent i k+1 's preference with R i k+1 * , where agent i k+1 receives consumption that is neither 0 nor . We let R k+1 = (R 1 k+1 R N k+1 ) denote the preference profile after the replacement. We consider replacing these k + 1 agents' preferences with preferences in the¯ neighborhoods of R i k+1 , i ∈ {i 1 i k+1 }, respectively, and obtain preference profileR k+1 = (R 1 k+1 R N k+1 ), whereR i k+1 ∈ B¯ (R i k+1 ) for i ∈ {i 1 i k+1 }, R i k+1 =R i for i / ∈ {i 1 i k+1 }, and there exists a (k + 2)th agent i k+2 / ∈ {i 1 i k+1 } who receives consumption in int A atR k+1 .
If such a preference profile does not exists, then f k+1 , which is the social choice function f restricted to agents i 1 i k+1 with other agents' preferences fixed toR i , is a social choice function in the (k + 1)-agent economy that is pseudo-efficient and strategy-proof on B¯ (R i 1 k+1 ) × · · · × B¯ (R i k+1 k+1 ) and it allocates consumption in int A to at least two agents at the preference profile (R i 1 k+1 R i k+1 k+1 ). Furthermore, R k+1 was obtained as a result of the replacement in Step k − 1 and the replacement of agent i k+1 's preference: R i k+1 =R i k ∈ B i¯ (R i k ) for i ∈ {i 1 i k } and R i k+1 k+1 = R i k+1 * . Combined with the result R i k ∈ B (k−2)¯ (R i * ) for any i ∈ {i 1 i k } in Step k − 1, we have R i k+1 ∈ B (k−1)¯ (R i * ) ⊂ Bˆ (R i * ) for any i ∈ {i 1 i k+1 }. Therefore, the consumption-direction vectors of these k + 1 agents are independent at (R i 1 k+1 R i k+1 k+1 ). This contradicts Proposition 6. Finally, in
Step N − 2, we replace agent i N−1 's preference with R i N−1 * , where agent i N receives consumption that is neither 0 nor . We let R N−1 = (R 1 N−1 R N N−1 )
denote the preference profile after the replacement. We consider replacing these N − 1 agents' preferences in the¯ -neighborhoods of R i N−1 , i ∈ {i 1 i N−1 }, respectively, and obtain preference profileR N−1 = (R 1 N−1 R N N−1 ), whereR i N−1 ∈ B¯ (R i N−1 ) for i ∈ {i 1 i N−1 },R i N−1 =R i for i / ∈ {i 1 i N−1 }, that is, for i = i N , and the agent i N receives consumption in int A atR N−1 . Note that R i N−1 ∈ B (N−3)¯ (R i * ) ⊂ Bˆ (R i * ) for i ∈ {i 1 i N−1 }. We replace agent i N 's preference R i N with R i N * and let R N denote the preference profile after this replacement. Because of strategy-proofness, agent i N receives consumption that is neither 0 nor at R N . Then the Pareto-efficient and strategyproof social choice function f allocates consumption in int A to at least two agents at R N ∈ N i=1 Bˆ (R i * ), where the consumption-direction vectors are independent. This contradicts Proposition 6. This ends the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Corollary
The theorem implies that if a social choice function f : R N → X is pseudo-efficient and strategy-proof, then f i (R) ∈ {0 } for any agent i and any R ∈ R N . We prove the corollary by repeatedly applying this result, as we repeatedly applied Proposition 6 to prove the theorem.
We let f :R N → X be a Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof social choice function defined on a domainR N , where R ⊂R ⊂ R C . As in the case of R ∈ R N , as mentioned in Section 3, f i (R) ∈ int A ∪ {0 } for any agent i and any preference profile R ∈R N . Therefore, all we have to prove is that f i (R) / ∈ int A for any agent i and any R ∈R N . We suppose thatR = (R 1 R N ) ∈R N is a preference profile where an agent receives consumption in int A, and show a contradiction. We let R * = (R 1 * R N * ) ∈ R N be a preference profile in R N . We repeat the replacement of the preferences of agents who receive positive consumption as follows. We first pick an agent i 1 who receives consumption in int A atR. We replace his preference with R i 1 * . Let R = (R 1 R N ) denote the new preference profile after this replacement: R i 1 = R i 1 * and R i =R i for i = i 1 . As agent i 1 's consumption at R is neither 0 nor , there exists another agent i 2 who receives positive consumption in int A at R . We replace this agent's preference with R i 2 * and let R denote the preference profile after this replacement. Note that agent i 2 's consumption at R is neither 0 nor .
Then we consider the replacement of agent i 1 's and agent i 2 's preferences with any preferences in R. As a result of the replacement, there should exist a preference profilẽ R = (R 1 R N ), whereR i 1 ∈ R,R i 2 ∈ R, andR i =R i for i / ∈ {i 1 i 2 }, and there exists another agent i 3 , different from i 1 and i 2 , receiving positive consumption in int A at R . If such a preference profile does not exist, then let f be the social choice function f restricted to agents i 1 and i 2 , with other agents preferences fixed toR i , i / ∈ {i 1 i 2 }. Then f is a social choice function in the two-agent economy of agents i 1 and i 2 that is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof on R × R and allocates consumption in int A to both agents at (R i 1 * R i 2 * ). This contradicts the theorem. Now we replace agent i 3 's preference with R i 3 * and let R denote the preference profile after the replacement: R i 1 =R i 1 , R i 2 =R i 1 , R i 3 = R i 3 * , and R i =R i for i / ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 }. Note that agent i 3 's consumption at R is neither 0 nor . Then we consider the replacement of the preferences of agents i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 with any preferences in R. As a result of the replacement, there exists a preference profileR , whereR i ∈ R for i ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 },R i =R i for i / ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 }, and there exists a fourth agent i 4 / ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 } who receives consumption in int A atR . If such a preference profile does not exist, then let f be the social choice function f restricted to agents i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 , with other agents' preferences fixed toR i , i / ∈ {i 1 i 2 i 3 }. Then f is a social choice function in the three-agent economy of agents i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 that is pseudo-efficient and strategy-proof on R × R × R and allocates positive consumption in int A to at least two agents at the preference profile (R i 1 R i 2 R i 3 ). This contradicts the theorem.
We replace the fourth agent's preference with R i 4 * and consider the replacement of these four agents' preferences with any preferences in R. Repeating this process, we finally obtain a preference profile in R N where at least two agents have consumption in int A. This contradicts the theorem and ends the proof of the corollary.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we prove that as long as there are at least as many goods as agents, a Paretoefficient and strategy-proof social choice function is alternately dictatorial. Our proof is based on the analysis of the option set. We show that the option set is the smooth surface of a strictly convex set if a consumption bundle is allocated in the interior of the feasible consumption set. Then we observe that such an option set induces allocations that contradict Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness to prove that any agent is allocated zero consumption or the total endowment. As far as we are aware, this paper is the first to investigate the option set in many-agent economies. We believe that this approach will be useful for the study of the properties of a strategy-proof social choice function in more general setups.
The difficulty in dealing with economies with many agents is that the price vector does not uniquely determine the allocation. In other words, the consumption bundle of an agent does not determine the other agents' consumption. This is in sharp contrast to two-agent economies, where one agent's consumption determines the other's uniquely, because their consumption bundles sum to the total endowment under Pareto efficiency. In this paper, to overcome this difficulty, we made the key assumption that there are at least as many goods as agents. Under this assumption, it is possible to find a preference profile that ensures the independence of the consumption-direction vectors. If the consumption-direction vectors are independent, then an agent's consumption determines other agents' consumption uniquely. Using this property, we first prove the alternately dictatorial result at such a preference profile and then extend it to preference profiles that may not satisfy the independence of the consumption-direction vectors.
It is still an open question whether a Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof social choice function is alternately dictatorial in economies where the number of agents exceeds the number of goods. It is clear that consumption-direction vectors are dependent in such an economy and that our approach cannot be applied directly to this type of economy. In future research, we hope to find answers to this challenging question. 
Appendix

A.1 Technical results
In this section, we prove some technical results concerning preference construction that we repeatedly use in the proofs of the lemmas and propositions. We fix any positive unit vector a ∈ S L−1 ++ and consider the L − 1-dimensional hyperplane a ⊥ . For y ∈ a ⊥ , we let L(y) denote the half-line starting from y and extending in the direction of the vector a: L(y) = {x ∈ R L |x = y + ta t ≥ 0}. For any consumption vector x ∈ R L + and any preference R ∈ R, the indifference set I(x; R) intersects with L(y) only once for any y ∈ a ⊥ because R is strictly monotonic in R L ++ . If A ⊂ R L ++ is a closed, strictly convex set with smooth boundary satisfying x + R L + ⊂ A for any x ∈ A, then there exists a preference R ∈ R such that A equals an upper contour set of R. Let B ⊂ R L ++ be a closed, convex set with a smooth boundary satisfying x + R + ⊂ B for any x ∈ B. When B does not satisfy strict convexity, it cannot be an upper contour set of a preference in R. We often make the set B into a strictly convex set by considering a convex combination of B with a strictly convex set A as follows. With a parameter s ∈ [0 1], we define I s as
Figure 4 depicts the construction of I s .
Lemma 5. For any s ∈ (0 1), the set I s + R L + , where I s is constructed by (2), is a closed, strictly convex set and its boundary I s is smooth.
Proof. We choose any orthogonal unit vectors e 1 e L−1 that span a ⊥ , and introduce a new orthogonal coordinate system (z 1 z L ) so that the set of vectors e 1 e L−1 , and a is its basis. That is, z = (z 1 z L ) in this coordinate system corresponds to
z L−1 ). As A and B are closed sets satisfying x + R L + ⊂ A for any x ∈ A and x + R L + ⊂ B for any x ∈ B, the half-line L(y) intersects with the boundaries ∂A and ∂B only once for any y ∈ a ⊥ . Thus, we let α : R L−1 → R + and β : R L−1 → R + be functions in the coordinate system (z 1 z l ) so that the graphs equal the boundaries ∂A and ∂B, respectively: 
For the strict convexity of I s + R L + , we need to prove the strict convexity of the function γ s . Pick any z −L ∈ R L−1 and z −L ∈ R L−1 , and let z −L = qz −L + (1 − q)z −L with any scalar q ∈ (0 1). All we have to show is
The left-hand side of (3) 
As A is strictly convex, the function α is strictly convex, and hence
As B is convex, the function β is convex, and hence
. Therefore, we have the inequality (3). As both A and B have smooth boundaries, the functions α and β are differentiable. 6 Then γ s is also differentiable, and I s is a smooth boundary of the set I s + R L + . 7 We often turn a convex set into a convex set with a smooth boundary by rounding its edges. Let A ⊂ R L be a closed convex set such that its interior is not empty. We let D ⊂ R L denote a closed ball with radius and define a closed set C as the union of such closed balls with radius included in A: C = D ⊂AD . If is sufficiently small, then there exists a closed ball with radius that is a subset of A, and hence C is not an empty set.
Lemma 6. Let A ⊂ R L be a closed, convex set such that int A = ∅. When is sufficiently small, C = D ⊂AD is a closed, convex set with a smooth boundary. If A is a strictly convex set, then C is a strictly convex set.
is the normal vector of the supporting hyperplane to the graph of g at (z −L g(z −L )) in the coordinate system (z 1 z L ). Proof. We prove that C is a closed set. We let {x n } ∞ n=0 be a sequence of points in C converging tox and provex ∈ C. From the definition of C, there exists a closed ballD n with radius such that x n ∈D n ⊂ A for each n. Let c n denote the center of the closed ball D n . As x n is convergent, the union nD n of the closed balls is bounded, and hence the sequence {c n } ∞ n=0 has a convergent subsequence {c n k } ∞ k=0 . We let c n k →c as k → ∞. We letD (c) denote the closed ball with center c and radius . Given x n k →x as k → ∞ and x n k ∈D (c k ) ⊂ A, we havex ∈D (c) ⊂ A. Therefore,x ∈ C from the definition of C.
We prove that C is a convex set. We let x ∈ C, x ∈ C, and s ∈ (0 1), and prove that sx + (1 − s)x ∈ C. From the definition of C, there exist closed ballsD andD such that x ∈D ⊂ A and x ∈D ⊂ A. Let K be the convex hull ofD ∪D : K = {z ∈ R L + |z = rz + (1 − r)z z ∈D z ∈D r ∈ [0 1]}. It is clear that sx + (1 − s)x ∈ K. As K equals the union of closed balls with radius that have their centers between the centers ofD andD , there exists a closed ballD with radius such that sx
We show that the boundary of C is smooth. If it is not smooth at a point x on the boundary of C, then there are two different hyperplanes tangent to C at x. However, as C is a union of closed balls, there should exist a closed ball with radius that is tangent to x and included in C. This is a contradiction.
Finally, we prove that C is a strictly convex set if A is also a strictly convex set. We suppose that C is not strictly convex. Given C is convex as shown above, this implies that there is a segment [x x ] in R L such that the segment is on the boundary of C and C is tangent to an L − 1-dimensional hyperplane H along the segment [x x ]. Then there exist closed ballsD andD in C with radius that are tangent to the hyperplane H at x and x . Let K be the convex hull ofD ∪D and let s ∈ (0 1) be any scalar. The convex hull K is tangent to H along the segment [x x ], and there exists a closed ballD ⊂ K with radius that is tangent to the hyperplane H at sx + (1 − s)x . Note that K ⊂ C ⊂ A because C is a convex set. From the definition of C, if a closed ballD in C with radius touches the boundary of C, then the closed ball also touches the boundary of A. That is, if there exists a point x ∈ ∂D ∩ ∂C, then there exists a point y, which might be different from x, such that y ∈ ∂D ∩ ∂A. As sx + (1 − s)x is in ∂D ∩ ∂C, the closed ballD touches the boundary of A, that is, there exists y such that y ∈ ∂D ∩ ∂A. Let H denotes the supporting hyperplane ofD at y. Given thatD is located betweenD andD in K, then, H , which is a supporting hyperplane of D , has an intersection with K other than y. Alternatively, strict convexity of A implies that A does not have an intersection with the hyperplane H other than y ∈ ∂A. This is a contradiction. Proof. Note that any point in the boundary of co(A ∪ B) is either in the boundary of A, in the boundary of B, or a convex combination of points in the boundaries of A and B. That is, if y ∈ ∂ co(A ∪ B), then either y ∈ ∂A, y ∈ ∂B, or y = sx + (1 − s)x , where x ∈ ∂A, x ∈ ∂B, and s ∈ (0 1).
We suppose that the boundary of co (A ∪ B) is not smooth at a point x on its boundary. That is, there are two different hyperplanes H and H tangent to co(A ∪ B) at x. As mentioned above, x ∈ ∂A, x ∈ ∂B, or x = sx + (1 − s)x , where x ∈ ∂A, x ∈ ∂B, and s ∈ (0 1). If x ∈ ∂A, then H and H are tangent to A at x, and this contradicts the smoothness of the boundary of A. Similarly, x ∈ ∂B contradicts the smoothness of ∂B.
We consider the case of x = sx + (1 − s)x , where x ∈ ∂A, x ∈ ∂B, and s ∈ (0 1). We show that H is tangent to co(A ∪ B) along the segment [x x ]. Note that the segment [x x ] is in co(A∪B) because of the convexity of co(A∪B). Given x = sx +(1−s)x ∈ H with s ∈ (0 1), if the segment [x x ] is not in H , then x and x are located in the two different sides of R L separated by H . This contradicts that H is the hyperplane tangent to co (A ∪ B) . Similarly, H is tangent to co(A ∪ B) along the segment [x x ]. Then both H and H are tangent to A at x ∈ ∂A. This contradicts the smoothness of the boundary of A.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We show an example of preference construction. For any x n ∈ R L ++ and p n ∈ S L−1 ++ , we construct a preference R n satisfying p n = p(R n x n ) as follows. We use the technical results in the previous section.
We let > 0 be a small scalar and define E as the intersection of the upper contour set UC(x n − p n ;R) ofR at x n − p n and the half-space H(x n + p n ; p n ): E = UC(x n − p n ;R) ∩ H(x n + p n ; p n ).
We then pick a preference R satisfying E ⊂ UC(x n ; R ) and p n = p(R x n ). The existence of such a preference R is clear from the fact that E is in the right-hand side of the hyperplane x n + p ⊥ n and is away from the hyperplane. We provide an example of the construction of such a preference R . We apply the methods in the previous section. We let UC(x ;R) be an upper contour set of the preferenceR at some consumption vector x such that E ⊂ UC(x ;R). Applying Lemma 6, we make the convex set H(x n ; p n ) ∩ UC(x ;R) into a convex set with smooth boundary. We let C denote the union of close balls with radius included in H(x n ; p n ) ∩ UC(x ;R): C = D ⊂H(x n ;p n )∩UC(x ;R)D , whereD denotes a closed ball with radius . We chose sufficiently small so that E ⊂ C . Since C is not strictly convex, it cannot be an upper contour set of a preference. By applying Lemma 5, we make C into a strictly convex set. We letR ∈ R be a preference such that p n = p(x n ;R). We fix any positive unit vector a ∈ S L−1 ++ and consider the L − 1-dimensional hyperplane a ⊥ . For y ∈ a ⊥ , we let L(y) denote the half-line starting from y and extending in the direction of the vector a: L(y) = {x ∈ R L |x = y + ta t ≥ 0}. With parameter s ∈ (0 1), we define I s as
We let R s ∈ R be the preference such that I s is its indifference set. We set R as a preference R s with s sufficiently small so that E ⊂ UC(x n ; R ). We have p n = p(R x n ) since we have chosenR so that p n = p(x n R ).
We continue the construction of R n . We define F ⊂ R L ++ as the intersection of the upper contour set of R at x n and that ofR at x n − p n : F = UC(x n ; R ) ∩ UC(x n − p n ;R). This F cannot be an upper contour set of a smooth preference because it has its edge at the intersection I(x n ; R ) ∩ I(x n − p n ;R). We round the edge by Lemma 6. We let < be a scalar smaller than . We letD ⊂ R L + denote a closed ball with radius and define a closed set C as the union of such closed balls with radius included in F : C = D ⊂FD . We define R n as the preference such that it has C as an upper contour set.
From the construction, R n satisfies p n = p(R n x n ). We observe that R n converges tō R as n → ∞ and in the above construction converges to 0. As → 0, the upper contour set U(x n ; R n ) converges to U(x n ;R) ∩ H(x n ; p n ). Furthermore, as n → ∞, we have p n → p and x n →x, and hence the set U(x n ;R) ∩ H(x n ; p n ) converges to U(x;R) ∩ H(x;p) = U(x;R). Therefore, as n → ∞ and → 0, the upper contour set of R n converges to that ofR, that is, the preference R n converges toR.
We now prove the second part of the lemma. Remember that the preference R n constructed above has C as its upper contour set and the set C is F = UC(x n ; R ) ∩ UC(x n − p n ;R), the edge of which is truncated. Therefore, any consumption bundle on the boundary of C, ∂C, is on either I(x n ; R ), I(x n − p n ;R) or on a set that arises from the edge truncation. If a consumption bundle on ∂C is on I(x n − p n ;R), then the gradient vector of R n is the same as that ofR at the consumption bundle. Therefore all we have to do is to construct C such that [x] ∩ ∂C ∈ I(x n − p n ;R) or, equivalently, [x] ∩ I(x n − p n ;R) ∈ ∂C. We write y = [x] ∩ I(x n − p n ;R).
When p n ([x] ∩ I(x n ;R)) > p n x n holds, we can construct such a C by taking R , , and suitably in the above construction. The assumption that p n ([x] ∩ I(x n ;R)) > p n x n implies that [x] ∩ I(x n ;R) is in the interior of H(x n ; p n ). Thus, we let be sufficiently small so that y is in the interior of H(x n ; p n ). We take the preference R in the above construction so that it additionally satisfies y ∈ P(x n ; R ). The existence of such an R is clear because y is in the right-hand side of the hyperplane x n + p ⊥ n and is away from the hyperplane. Then observe that the intersection of [x] and the boundary of F is on I(x n − p n ;R). Now we take a sufficiently small in the above construction so that y is not truncated in the process of rounding the edge. More rigorously, we take < such that the closed ballD ⊂ UC(x n − p n ;R) tangent to I(x n − p n ;R) at y is in P(x n ; R ). ThenD ⊂ P(x n ; R ) ∩ UC(x n − p n ;R) ⊂ F , and y is not truncated; that is, y is on ∂C, as desired.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
As f j (R) = f j (R) = 0 andR j andR j have the same gradient vector at f j (R), we have p(R f ) = p(R f ) and g(R i p(R f )) = g(R i p(R f )) for any i.
As consumption at preference profilesR andR, respectively, sum up to the total endowment , we have
Considering the difference between these equations,
As the consumption-direction vectors are independent, this equation implies that f i (R) = f i (R) for all i = j. Thus, we obtain the equality of the two allocations: f (R) = f (R).
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
We letR i ∈ B i be an MMT of R i at x and show that x = f i (R i R −i ). AsR i is an MMT of R i at x, UC(x;R i ) \ x ⊂ P(x; R i ). Therefore, x is the unique, most preferred consumption bundle in G i (R −i ) with respect toR i .
As x ∈ G i (R −i ), there exists ax ∈ G i (R −i ) arbitrarily close to x. Thus, if x is strictly preferred to f i (R i R −i ) with respect toR i , thenx is strictly preferred to f i (R i R −i ). This contradicts the strategy-proofness of f . Therefore, f i (R i R −i ) ∈ UC(x;R i ). Then f i (R i R −i ) = x contradicts that x is the unique most preferred consumption bundle in
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Without loss of generality, we prove the statement for agent 1. We write f (R) =x = (x 1
x N ) andp = p(R f ). From the definitions,x 1 is (one of) the most preferred consumption bundles in G 1 (R −1 ) with respect toR 1 , and no consumption bundle in G 1 (R −1 ) is strictly preferred tox 1 with respect toR 1 . 8 We suppose that there exists another consumption bundlex 1 in G 1 (R −1 ) that is indifferent tox 1 with respect toR 1 , and show a contradiction.
We letR 1 be an MMT ofR 1 atx 1 . As in Lemma 3,
x N ) and letp = p((R R −1 ) f ) denote the price vector at this allocation. Figure 5 describes the situation where the closure of agent 1's option set has two most preferred consumption bundlesx 1 andx 1 with respect to the preferenceR 1 , contrary to the statement of the lemma. In the following proof, we observe that such an option set contradicts the pseudo-efficiency and strategy-proofness of the social choice function.
We construct agent 1's new preferences R 1 t as follows. In addition toR 1 , which is an MMT ofR 1 atx 1 , we pick R 1 , which is an MMT ofR 1 atx 1 . Let > 0 be a sufficiently small scalar. For a parameter t ∈ (1 − 1) sufficiently close to 1, we define K t as the convex hull of the set UC(tx 1 ;R 1 ) ∪ UC(x 1 ; R 1 ):
We set sufficiently small so that for any t ∈ (1 − 1),p andp are normal vectors of the supporting hyperplanes to K t at tx 1 andx 1 , respectively. Applying Lemma 5 with K t , we slightly modify the indifference set I(x 1 ;R 1 ). We consider the hyperplane (x 1 ) ⊥ passing through the origin and perpendicular to the vector x 1 . For each y ∈ (x 1 ) ⊥ , we let L(y) denote the half-line starting from y and extending in 8 As in the proof of Lemma 3, if there exists an x ∈ G 1 (R −1 ) that is strictly preferred tox with respect tō the direction ofx 1 : L(y) = {x ∈ R L |x = y + rx 1 r ≥ 0}. We fix a scalars < 1 close to 1 and define
We let R 1 t ∈ R be agent 1's preference that has I t as its indifference set. Note that R 1 t can be arbitrarily close toR 1 by settings close to 1. Therefore, we sets sufficiently close to 1 so that R 1 t is in B 1 for any t ∈ (1 − 1). Note that both R 1 t andR 1 have the same gradient vectorsp andp atx 1 andx 1 , respectively. Observe that R 1 t is an MMT ofR 1 atx 1 . Furthermore, observe that UC(x 1 ; R 1 t ) ∩ LC(x 1 ;R 1 ) consists of the pointx 1 and a set in a neighborhood ofx 1 that converges tox 1 as t converges to 1.
We write f (R 1
). These t in x i t should not be confused with the subscripts labeling goods. Since R 1 t is an MMT ofR 1 atx 1 , x 1 t =x 1 . We can select a small positive vector α ∈ R L ++ such that for any t ∈ (1 − 1), there exists an agent i t ∈ {2 N} whose consumption x i t t is strictly preferred tox i t + α with respect toR i t : x i t t ∈ P(x i t + α;R i t ). Contrary to this, suppose that for any vector α ∈ R L ++ , there exists some t α ∈ (1 − 1) such thatx i + α ∈ UC(x i t α ;R i ) holds for any i = 2 N. Then, with a sufficiently small α, (x i + x i t α )/2 is strictly preferred to x i t α with respect tō R i for any i = 2 N by the strict convexity of the preferences. Similarly, x 1 t α =x 1 and (x 1 +x 1 t α )/2 is preferred to x 1 t α with respect to R 1 t α when t α is sufficiently close to 1. These contradict the Pareto efficiency of x t α .
For each i = 2 N, we let T i denote the set of t such that x i t is strictly preferred tō x i + α with respect toR i : T i = {t ∈ (1 − 1) : x i t ∈ P(x i + α;R i )}. Note that there exists some i such that T i ∩ [t 1) = ∅ for any t ∈ (1 − 1). If there does not exist any such i, then for each i = 2 N, there exists a t i such that T i ∩ [t i 1) = ∅, and there exists no i
, which is a contradiction. Without loss of generality, we assume that agent 2 is such an agent: T 2 ∩ [t 1) = ∅ for any t ∈ (1 − 1). From now on, we only consider t in T 2 . In particular, we select a sequence of t's in T 2 converging to 1.
We pickR 2 ∈ B 2 such that (i)R 2 is an MMT ofR 2 atx 2 , (ii) x 2 t ∈ P(x 2 ;R 2 ) for t ∈ T 2 , and
N. The condition (iii) requires that on the L − 1-dimensional indifference surface I(x 2 ;R 2 ), the point where the gradient vectorp is not in the N − 2-dimensional set I(x 2 ;R 2 ) ∩ S(g(R 2 p) g(R N p)). As for (ii), we have x 2 t ∈ P(x 2 + α;R 2 ) ⊂ P(x 2 ;R 2 ) for t ∈ T 2 as shown above. Thus, we haveR 2 ∈ B 2 satisfying (i)-(iii).
Observe that f 2 (R 1 R 2 R −{1 2} ) =x 2 becauseR 2 ∈ B 2 is an MMT ofR 2 atx 2 . Therefore, f 1 (R 1 R 2 R −{1 2} ) =x 1 as shown in Lemma 2.
x N t ) and focus onx 1 t for t ∈ T 2 . Facing the other agents' preferences (R 2 R −{1 2} ), agent 1 can achievex 1 by reportingR 1 , as mentioned above. Therefore,x 1 t should be preferred tox 1 with respect to R 1 t . Alternatively,x 1 N i=1x i = and
In the right-hand side of this equation,
, and the gradient vector ofR 2 atx 2 t does not converge top because of (iii). This contradicts the discussion in the previous paragraph.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 1
We only have to prove that if the consumption-direction vectors g(R i p(R f )), i = 1 N, are independent atR and if f i (R) ∈ int A for an agent i, then f (· R −i ) is a continuous function atR i . Suppose that the claim is true and let R i be a preference close toR i . Then f (R i R −i ) is close to f (R) because of the supposed continuity, and hence the consumption-direction vectors of agents at the preference profile (R i R i ) are still independent and f i (R i R −i ) ∈ int A. Then f (· R −i ) is continuous at R i because of the supposed claim.
We first prove that f i (· R −i ) is a continuous function atR i . We let {R i n } ∞ n=1 be a sequence of preferences in B i converging toR i as n → ∞. There exists a convergent subsequence {f i n k (R i R −i )} ∞ k=1 because of the compactness of the feasible allocation set. We write f i (R i n k R −i ) → x i * as k → ∞. All we have to show is that x i * = f i (R).
We observe that x i * is indifferent to f i (R) with respect toR i . If x i * ∈ P(f i (R);R i ), then f i (R i n k R −i ) ∈ P(f i (R);R i ) for a sufficiently large k. This contradicts the strategyproofness on B. If f i (R) ∈ P(x i * ;R i ), then f i (R) ∈ P(f i (R i n k R −i ); R i n k ) for a sufficiently large k because f i (R i n k R −i ) converges to x i * as k → ∞ and P(x; R i n k ) converges to P(x;R i ) at any consumption x as k → ∞. Again, this contradicts the strategy-proofness on B. Thus, x i * is indifferent to f i (R) with respect toR i . Alternatively,
We now prove the continuity of f j (· R −i ) atR i , j = i. We proved the continuity of
is a sequence of preferences in B i converging toR i as n → ∞, then f i (R i n R −i ) converges to f i (R). According to this convergence, the gra-
As in the proof of Lemma 2, f j (R) = f j (R) g(R j p(R f )) for any preference profile R ∈ B, and the sum of the agents' consumption equals the total endowment. Thus, we have two equalities:
Considering the difference between these equalities, we have
As n → ∞, the first and third elements in the last equation converge to 0. As g(R j p(R f )), j = i, are independent vectors, f j (R i n R −i ) converges to f j (R) for any j = i.
This implies that f j (R i n R −i ) converges to f j (R) for any j as n → ∞. That is, f j (· R −i ) is continuous atR i for any j = i.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 2
We first show that for any R i in a neighborhood ofR i ,
That is, there exists a positive scalar R i , depending on R i , such that
Note that all we have to show is the existence of an Ri satisfying (4) atR, where consumption-direction vectors are independent and f i (R) ∈ int A. Suppose this claim to be true. If R i is in a neighborhood ofR i , then f (R i R −i ) is in a neighborhood of f (R) by Proposition 1, and, hence, the consumption-direction vectors of agents remain independent at the preference profile (R i R −i ) and f i (R i R −i ) ∈ int A. Then there exists an R i satisfying (4) by the supposed claim. Contrary to the existence of an Ri satisfying (4), we suppose that G i (R −i ) has an intersection with f i (R) + p(R f ) ⊥ + R L ++ in any neighborhood of f i (R). Then we have a preference in a neighborhood ofR i that has two most preferred consumption bundles in G i (R −i ), which contradicts Lemma 4. The rigorous proof proceeds as follows. We write f (R) = (x 1 x N ) and p(R f ) =p. We construct agent i's new preference as follows. For a parameter > 0, we consider the set H(x i ;p) ∩ UC(x i − p;R i ). Applying Lemma 6, we round the edge of this set. We let < be a scalar smaller than and consider a closed ballD with radius . We let C be the union of such closed balls with radius included in the set H(
Note that the surface of the set C is flat in a neighborhood ofx i . We apply Lemma 5 to make C into an upper contour set of a preference. We fix any positive unit vector a ∈ S L−1 ++ and consider the L − 1-dimensional linear space a ⊥ . For y ∈ a ⊥ , we let L(y) denote the half-line starting from y and extending in the direction of the vector a: L(y) = {x ∈ R L |x = y + ta t ≥ 0}. For a parameter t ∈ (0 1], we let R i t be agent i's preference that has as its indifference set
Observe that R i 1 =R i and that R i t is an MMT of R i t atx i for t > t , and the indifference set I(x i ; R i t ) becomes flatter in a neighborhood ofx i as t → 0. Furthermore, observe that if is sufficiently small, then ∂C is close to the indifference set I(x i ;R i ), and hence R i t is close toR i for any t. We let be sufficiently small such that R i t ∈ B i for any t ∈ (0 1].
For any t,x i is an intersection between G i (R −i ) and UC(x i ; R i t ), and it is the unique intersection for t = 1. By the assumption that G i (R −i ) has an intersection withx i +p ⊥ + R L ++ in any neighborhood ofx i , UC(x i ; R i t ) has intersections with G i (R −i ) other thanx i when t is small. We let t( ) be the largest t such that UC(x i ; R 1 t ) has such an intersection
++ . Then, with respect to R i t( ) , there exist two most preferred consumption bundles in G i (R −i ) and this contradicts Lemma 4. This ends the proof of the existence of R i satisfying (4).
We now prove the statement of the proposition. For example, we choose the scalars and satisfying (1) as follows. We consider R i satisfying (4) for each R i in a neighborhood ofR i . For > 0, we consider the -neighborhood ofR i , i.e., B (R i ) , and define α( ) as the infimum of R i for R i ∈ B (R i ): α( ) = inf R i ∈B (R i ) R i . Note that → α( ) is a positive and decreasing function by the definition. Alternatively, we define β( ) as the supremum of the distance between f (R i R −i ) and f i (R) for R i ∈ B (R i ):
. Note that → β( ) is a positive and increasing function and β( ) → 0 as → 0 because of the continuity of f . We pick a scalar satisfying β( ) < 1 2 α( ) and define¯ = β( ). The existence of such a scalar is ensured by the properties of the functions → α( ) and → β( ) mentioned above.
It can be easily seen that these are the desired scalars. If R i is in the neighborhood B (R i ) ofR i , then in the neighborhood D α( ) (f i (R i R −i )), the option set G i (R −i ) is in the lower left-hand side of the hyperplane f (
As the distance between f i (R i R −i ) and f (R) is at most¯ and α( ) > 2¯ , we have
Hence, we have (1).
A.8 Proof of Proposition 3
As in the proof of Proposition 2, we only have to prove that if the consumption-direction vectors are independent atR and if f i (R) ∈ int A, then the statement of the proposition holds at the preference profileR.
Without loss of generality, we prove the proposition for agent 1. We suppose that g(R i p(R f )), i = 1 N, are independent atR = (R 1 R N ) ∈ B and f 1 (R) ∈ int A.
We write f (R) =x = (x 1 x N ) and p(R f ) =p. We have to prove thatx 1 is the unique intersection between G 1 (R −1 ) andx 1 +p ⊥ in a neighborhood ofx 1 . Contrary to the statement of the proposition, we suppose that for any scalar > 0, there existsx 1 in the -neighborhood D (x 1 ) ofx 1 such thatx 1 is different fromx 1 , and thatx 1 is the intersection between G 1 (R −1 ) andx 1 +p ⊥ . We show a contradiction.
We first observe that when is sufficiently small, the hyperplanex 1 +p ⊥ is tangent to
We pick an arbitrary consumption bundle x 1 ∈ (x 1 x 1 ) ≡ {tx 1 + (1 − t)x 1 ∈ R L + : 0 < t < 1} and consider a preference R 1 in a neighborhood ofR 1 so that the gradient vector of R 1 at x 1 isp. When is sufficiently small, x 1 is sufficiently close tox 1 , and we can have such a preference R 1 in a neighborhood ofR 1 . We let x 1 denote the most preferred consumption in G 1 (R −1 ) with respect to R 1 and let p denote the gradient vector of R 1 at x 1 . As shown in Proposition 2, x 1 is in the lower left-hand side of the hyperplanex 1 +p ⊥ . Therefore,px 1 ≤px 1 =px 1 , and hencepx 1 ≤px 1 . By the same reasoning,x 1 andx 1 are in the lower left-hand side of the hyperplane x 1 + (p ) ⊥ . Therefore, p x 1 ≤ p x 1 and p x 1 ≤ p x 1 , and hence p x 1 ≤ p x 1 . These two inequalities are satisfied for the two combinations (p x 1 ) and (p x 1 ) of a gradient vector and a consumption bundle with the preference R 1 if and only ifp = p and x 1 = x 1 . As our choice of x 1 is arbitrary on (x 1 x 1 ), this implies thatx 1 +p ⊥ is tangent to G 1 (R −1 ) along the segment [x 1 x 1 ]. From now on, we assume that is sufficiently small so thatx 1 +p ⊥ is tangent to For each , we pick a consumption bundlex 1 ∈ (x 1 x 1 ) and a preferenceR 1 such that the gradient vector ofR 1 atx 1 isp andR 1 converges toR 1 as → 0. We can have such a preference becausex 1 →x as → 0. Similarly, we letR 1 be a preference such that the gradient vector ofR 1 atx 1 isp andR 1 converges to R 1 as → 0. It is clear that
. For agent i = 1, the consumption bundles,x i ,x i , andx i are all on the same ray [g(R i p)] because of the same price vectorp. Under the independence of the consumption-direction vectors, which holds for preferences in a neighborhood ofR, x 1 =x 1 implies that there exists an agent i = 1 such thatx i =x i . Without loss of generality, we assume agent 2 is such an agent. Thenx 2 is betweenx 2 andx 2 on the same ray, and eitherx 2 <x 2 <x 2 orx 2 <x 2 <x 2 holds. Figure 6 describes the situation where the closure of agent 1's option set is tangent to the hyperplanex 1 +p ⊥ along the segment [x 1 x 1 ], contrary to the statement of the proposition. In the following proof, we show that the other agents' option sets are also flat and observe that such flat option sets contradict the pseudo-efficiency and strategyproofness of the social choice function.
We now show that when is sufficiently small, G 2 (R 1 R−{1 2} ) is flat in a neighborhood ofx 2 . We suppose that it is not flat in any neighborhood ofx 2 , as drawn in Figure 5 . We let > 0 be a scalar and letŘ 2 be agent 2's preference in theneighborhood B (R 2 ) ofR 2 such that the gradient vectorp ofŘ 2 at the most preferred consumption bundle in G 2 (R 1 R−{1 2} ) with respect toŘ 2 is different fromp, as drawn in the figure. As the closure of the option set is not flat in any neighborhood ofx 2 , we can have such a preferenceŘ 2 in any -neighborhood ofR 2 . We write
x N ). 9 We havep →p andx →x as → 0.
Asx 1 is betweenx 1 andx 1 , eitherp x 1 >p x 1 >p x 1 ,p x 1 <p x 1 < p x 1 , orp x 1 =p x 1 =p x 1 holds. Whenp x 1 >p x 1 >p x 1 , as drawn in Figure 2 , or whenp x 1 =p x 1 =p x 1 , we focus on the two combinations (x 1 p) and (x 1 p ) of a consumption bundle and a price vector. We consider a preference R 1 in a neighborhood ofR 1 such that the gradient vector of R 1 atx 1 isp and that ať
For example, such a preference R 1 can be obtained as follows. We write y = [x 1 ] ∩ I(x 1 ;R 1 ). We let R * be an MMT ofR 1 atx 1 and let K denote the convex hull of UC(x 1 ;R 1 ) ∪ UC(x 1 R * ): K = co(UC(x 1 ;R 1 ) ∪ UC(x 1 R * )). Observe that the convex hull K is tangent to the hyperplane y +p ⊥ at y . This K cannot be an upper contour set of a preference because it is not a strictly convex set. We let R be a preference such that its gradient vector at y isp and its upper contour set at y includes K : K ⊂ UC(y ; R ). We use R and make K into an upper contour set of a preference by applying Lemma 5. We fix any positive unit vector a ∈ S L−1 ++ and consider the L − 1-dimensional linear space a ⊥ . For y ∈ a ⊥ , we let L(y) denote the halfline starting from y and extending in the direction of the vector a: L(y) = {x ∈ R L |x = y + ta t ≥ 0}. We let R be a preference, for which the indifference set at y is
with a sufficiently small s > 0. Finally, we construct a preference R 1 in a neighborhood of R such thatp = p(R 1 x 1 ) andp = p(R 1 x 1 ) by directly applying the preference construction in Lemma 1 so thatR, (x p), and (x n p n ) in Lemma 1 correspond to R , (x p ), and (x p) in the present setup, respectively. We observe that Lemma 1 can be applied to R when , , and s in (5) are sufficiently small. As → 0, we havex →x. As → 0, we havex →x andp →p. Thus, when and are sufficiently small, we havex 1 andp sufficiently close tō x 1 andp, respectively. Therefore, we can apply the preference construction method in Lemma 1. The condition in Lemma 1 isp([x ] ∩ I(x; R )) >px in the present setup. We set and . As s → 0 in (5), UC(x 1 ; R ) converges to K and [x ] ∩ I(x; R ) converges to y , which satisfiespy >px. Therefore, the condition is satisfied when s in (5) is sufficiently small.
Next, we observe that R 1 is in a neighborhood ofR 1 when , , and s in (5) are sufficiently small. As → 0, we havex 1 →x 1 andR →R 1 , and, hence, UC(x 1 ;R ) converges to UC(x;R 1 ). Since UC(x 1 ; R * ) ⊂ UC(x 1 ;R 1 ), K converges to UC(x;R 1 ). As s → 0 in (5), UC(y ; R ) converges to K . Therefore, as → 0 and s → 0, UC(y ; R ) converges to UC(x 1 ;R 1 ) and R converges toR 1 . As R 1 converges to R as → 0 and → 0, we have R 1 in a neighborhood ofR 1 as desired when , , and s are sufficiently small. With the preference R 1 , we have f (R 1 Ř 2 R −{1 2} ) =x and f (R 1 R −2 ) =x. This contradicts the strategy-proofness of f on B with respect to agent 2 be-causex →x as → 0, andx 2 , which is on the same ray asx 2 , satisfiesx 2 <x 2 or x 2 <x 2 as mentioned above.
The discussion is symmetric whenp x 1 <p x 1 <p x 1 . We focus on the two pairs (x 1 p ) and (x 1 p). Similar to the discussion above, we can construct a preference R 1 in a neighborhood ofR 1 , and thus in a neighborhood ofR 1 , such that the gradient vectors of R 1 atx 1 andx 1 arep andp , respectively. Then we have f (R 1 Ř 2 R −{1 2} ) =x , which converges tox as → 0, and f (R 1 R −2 ) =x . This again contradicts the strategy-proofness of f on B with respect to agent 2. This ends the proof that G 2 (R 1 R−{1 2} ) is flat in a neighborhood ofx 2 when is sufficiently small. In addition tox 1 andR 1 , we pick another consumption bundlex 1 ( =x 1 ) on (x 1 x 1 ) and another preferenceŔ 1 for each such that the gradient vector ofŔ 1 at
x N ). Similar to the discussion above, G 2 (Ŕ 1 R−{1 2} ) is flat in a neighborhood ofx 2 when is sufficiently small. Under the independence of the consumption-direction vectors,x 2 is on the same ray aŝ x 2 andx 2 =x 2 because ofx 1 =x 1 . Now we exchange the roles of agents 1 and 2. Facing the closure of the option set
, which is flat in a neighborhood ofx 2 , we let be a scalar such that with respect to any preference R 2 in the -neighborhood B (R 2 ) of R 2 , the most preferred consumption bundle in G 2 (R 1 R−{1 2} ), which should be f 2 (R 1 R 2 R −{1 2} ), is in the flat part. Then p(R 1 R 2 R {1 2} ) =p. In particular, for each sufficiently small scalar , we letR 2 be agent 2's preference in B 2 (R 2 ) such that f 2 (R 1 R 2 R −{1 2} ) − x 2 / ∈ S(g(R 3 ;p) g(R N ;p)), where S(g(R 3 ;p) g(R N ;p)) denotes the N − 2-dimensional linear space spanned by the consumption-direction vectors of agents i = 3 N. We can have such a preferenceR 2 because we can have
We write f (R 1 R 2 R −{1 2} ) =x = (x 1 x N ). Similar to the discussion above, we now have thatx 1 ( =x 1 ) is on the same ray asx 1 and G 1 (R 2 R−{1 2} ) is flat in a neighborhood ofx 1 when is sufficiently small.
We write f (Ŕ 1 R 2 R −{1 2} ) =ẋ = (ẋ 1 ẋ N ). As → 0, we haveR 2 →R 2 , and henceẋ →x . Therefore, when is sufficiently small,ẋ 2 is on the flat part of G 2 (Ŕ 1 R−{1 2} ) in a neighborhood ofx 2 . As → 0, bothR 1 andŔ 1 converges toR 1 and, hence, both preferences become closer. Therefore, when is sufficiently small,ẋ 1 is sufficiently close tox 1 and it is in the flat part of G 1 (R 2 R−{1 2} ) in a neighborhood of x 1 . Now we consider four allocationsx ,x ,x , andẋ with sufficiently small and . Clearly, these satisfy four equations:
and
As the price vectorp is the same in all allocations, and the preferences of all agents, except agents 1 and 2, are unchanged, we have, for i = 3 N,
with some scalars a i , b i , and c i . As for agent 1, we havex 1 = tx 1 andẋ 1 = tx 1 with a scalar t, becausex 1 andx 1 are on the same ray 
From the first and second equations, we have
From the third and fourth equations, we have
Because of the independence of the consumption-direction vectors andx 1 = 0, is not in the linear space spanned byx 3 x N . Thus, these two equations hold only if s = 1 or t = 1. However, this contradicts thatx 1 =x 1 andx 2 =x 2 .
A.9 Proof of Proposition 4
Without loss of generality, we prove the statement for agent 1. We suppose that g(R i p(R f )), i = 1 N, are independent atR = (R 1 R N ) and that f 1 (R) ∈ int A.
We write f (R) =x = (x 1 x N ) andp = p(R f ).
As shown in Proposition 2,x 1 +p ⊥ is a hyperplane tangent to G 1 (R −1 ) at x 1 , and G 1 (R −1 ) is in the lower left-hand side of this hyperplane. We suppose that G 1 (R −1 ) has an edge atx 1 and that there exists another hyperplane tangent to G 1 (R −1 ) atx 1 with a normal vectorp different fromp. We show a contradiction.
As G 1 (R −1 ) is in the lower left-hand side ofx 1 +p ⊥ , and in the lower left-hand side ofx 1 +p ⊥ , any hyperplanex 1 + (tp +(1 − t)p) ⊥ , t ∈ [0 1], is tangent to G 1 (R −1 ) atx 1 We let > 0 be a small scalar. For each , we pick a preferenceR 1 in theneighborhood B (R 1 ) ofR 1 such that the gradient vector ofR 1 atx 1 is different fromp andx 1 is the most preferred consumption bundle in G 1 (R −1 ) with respect toR 1 . The existence of such a preference should be clear from the above discussion. We letp denote the gradient vector ofR 1 atx 1 :p = p(R 1 x 1 ). We write f (R 1 R −1 ) =x = (x 1 x N ). It is clear thatx 1 =x 1 andp = p((R 1 R −1 ) f ). As → 0,R →R 1 ,p →p, andx →x. Figure 7 describes the situation where the closure of agent 1's option set has an edge at x 1 , contrary to the statement of the proposition. In the following proof we observe that this induces allocations that contradict the pseudo-efficiency and strategy-proofness of the social choice function f .
As f 1 (R) ∈ int A and f i (R) ∈ int A ∪ {0 } for any i as observed at the end of Section 3, there exists another agent receiving positive consumption in int A. Without loss of generality, we assume that agent 2 is such an agent: f 2 (R) ∈ int A. AsR 1 andR 1 have different gradient vectors atx 1 , P(x 1 ;R 1 ) \ UC(x 1 ;R 1 ) = ∅. Then there exists a consumption bundle y in any neighborhood ofx 1 such that y is indifferent tox 1 with respect toR 1 and y is strictly preferred tox 1 with respect toR 1 . We let {y n } ∞ n=1 be a sequence of such consumption bundles converging tox 1 as n → ∞: y n ∈ I(x 1 ;R 1 ), y n ∈ P(x 1 ;R 1 ), and y n →x 1 as n → ∞. We let p n denote the gradient vector ofR 1 at y n : p n = p(R 1 y n ).
We focus on agent 2. With each sufficiently large n, we let x 2 n be a consumption vector on G 2 (R −2 ) such that the hyperplane x 2 n + p ⊥ n is tangent to G 2 (R −2 ) at x 2 n . Such a consumption vector x 2 n is obtained uniquely becausex 2 is the unique intersection between G 2 (R −2 ) andx 1 +p ⊥ , as shown in Proposition 3, and p n →p as n → ∞. We have x 2 n →x 2 as n → ∞. 10 We let R 2 n be agent 2's preference that has gradient vector p n at x 2 n and converges toR 2 as n → ∞. Such a preference can be obtained by directly applying the preference construction in the first part of Lemma 1 so thatR, (x p), and (x n p n ) in Lemma 1 correspond toR 2 , (x 2 p), and (x 2 n p n ), respectively, in the present setup. It is clear that with respect to R 2 n , x 2 n is the most preferred consumption bundle in G 2 (R −2 ), and, hence, f 2 (R 2 n R −2 ) = x 2 n and p((R 2 n R −2 ) f ) = p 2 n . We write f (R 2 n R −2 ) = x n = (x 1 n x N n ). Observe that x 1 n is on the ray [y n ].
For each sufficiently small , there exists a sufficiently large n, and we can have agent 2's preferenceR 2 n in B 2 such that (I) the gradient vector ofR 2 n atx 2 isp , and (II) the gradient vector ofR 2 n at x 2 n is p n . To obtain such a preference, we directly apply the preference construction in Lemma 1 so thatR, (x p), and (x n p n ) in Lemma 1 correspond toR 2 , (x 2 p ), and (x 2 n p n ), respectively, in the present setup. We observe that we can apply the preference construction in Lemma 1. As → 0, x 2 →x 2 andp →p. As n → ∞, x 2 n →x 2 and p 2 n →p. Therefore, when is sufficiently small and n is sufficiently large, x 2 n and p n are sufficiently close tox 2 andp , respectively, and, hence, we can apply Lemma 1. We set a sufficiently small . The strict convexity of R 2 ensures thatp([x 2 ] ∩ I(x 2 ;R 2 )) >px 2 . As n → ∞, x 2 n →x 2 and p 2 n →p. Therefore, we have the condition in Lemma 1, p n ([x 2 ] ∩ I(x 2 n ;R 2 )) > p n x 2 n in the present setup when n is sufficiently large.
We write f (R 2 n R −2 ) =x n = (x 1 n x N n ) and f (R 1 R 2 n R −{1 2} ) =x n = (x 1 n x N n ). We havex 2 n =x 2 because of (I) and, hence,x n =x by Lemma 2. Alternatively, we havex 2 n = x 2 n because of (II) and, hence,x n = x n . In particular, note that x 1 n = x 1 n and, hence,x 1 n is on the ray [y n ]. We first consider the case wherex 1 n ∈ P(x 1 ;R 1 ). If agent 1 has the preferenceR 1 and faces other agents' preferences (R 2 n R −{1 2} ), he is better off by reportingR 1 and achievingx 1 n than reporting the true preferenceR 1 and achievingx 1 n =x 1 =x 1 . This contradicts the strategy-proofness of f on B.
Next, we consider the casex 1 n / ∈ UC(x 1 ;R 1 ). If agent 1 has preferenceR 1 and faces other agents' preferences (R 2 n R −{1 2} ), he is better off by reportingR 1 and achievinǧ x 1 n =x 1 =x 1 than reporting his true preferenceR 1 and achievingx 1 n . Again, this contradicts the strategy-proofness of f on B.
Asx 1 n ∈ [y ], where y n ∈ I(x 1 ;R 1 ) and y n ∈ P(x 1 ;R 1 ), only these two cases need to be considered.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 5
Without loss of generality, we prove the proposition for agent 1. We suppose that g(R i p(R f )), i = 1 N, are independent atR = (R 1 R N ) and that f 1 (R) ∈ int A.
We write f (R) = x = (x 1 x N ) and p(R f ) =p. We consider the Cobb-Douglas utility functions u α (x) = x
++ and the preferences represented by these utility functions. Observe that the gradient vector of the preferences represented by the utility function u α (x) at a consumption bundle x = (x 1 x L ) is given by the normalization of (
). Alternatively, if a preference represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function u α (x) has gradient vector p = (p 1 p L ) at x = (x 1 x L ), then the parameter α is the normalization of (p 1 x 1 p L x L ). We let u α * (x) be the Cobb-Douglas utility function such that agent 1's preference R 1α * represented by u α * (x) has gradient vectorp atx 1 .
We consider a preference R 1α represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function u α , where α is in a neighborhood of α * . Then, of course, R 1α is in a neighborhood of R 1α * .
As f is supposed to satisfy pseudo-efficiency and strategy-proofness only on B, we letf 1 (R 1α R −1 ) denote the most preferred consumption in G 1 (R −1 ) with respect to the preference R 1α . If R 1α ∈ B 1 , then, of course, f (R 1α R −1 ) =f (R 1α R −1 ).
We havef (R 1α * R −i ) =x andf 1 (R 1α R −i ) is in a neighborhood ofx 1 when α is in a neighborhood of α * because of the properties of G 1 (R −1 ) shown in Propositions 2-4. Observe that α = α implies thatf 1 (R 1α R −1 ) =f 1 (R 1α R −1 ) becausef 1 (R 1α R −1 ) = f 1 (R 1α R −1 ) and α = α imply that R 1α and R 1α have different gradient vectors at the same consumption bundle, which contradicts Proposition 4. Thus, eachf 1 (R 1α R −1 ) in a neighborhood ofx 1 is identified with the corresponding parameter α ∈ S L−1 ++ in a neighborhood of α * and, hence, in a neighborhood ofx 1 , αf 1 (R 1α R −1 ) is an L − 1-dimensional manifold.
To end the proof, we prove that in a neighborhood ofx 1 , αf 1 (R 1α R −1 ), G 1 (R −1 ), and G 1 (R −1 ) coincide. We letp α denote the gradient vector of R 1α atf 1 (R 1α R −1 ): p α = p(R 1α f 1 (R 1α R −1 )). When α is in a neighborhood of α * andf 1 (R 1α R −1 ) is in a neighborhood ofx 1 , we construct a new preferenceR 1 ∈ B 1 such that the gradient vector ofR 1 atf 1 (R 1α R −1 ) isp α . For example such a preferenceR 1 can be obtained by applying the preference construction in the first part of Lemma 1 so thatR, (x p), and (x n p n ) in Lemma 1 correspond toR 1 , (x 1 p), and (f 1 (R 1α R −1 ) p α ), respectively, in the present setup. As α converges to α * ,f 1 (R 1α R −1 ) converges tox 1 andp α converges top, and, hence, Lemma 1 is applicable andR 1 converges toR 1 , as shown in the lemma. Thenf 1 (R 1α R −1 ) p α ) is the most preferred consumption in G 1 (R −1 ) with respect toR 1 ∈ B 1 , andf 1 (R 1α R −1 ) = f (R 1 R −1 ) ∈ G 1 (R −1 ), as in Lemma 3. Therefore, we have αf (R 1α R −1 ) ⊂ G 1 (R −1 ) ⊂ G 1 (R −1 ) in a neighborhood ofx 1 . To observe that any element of G 1 (R −1 ) in a neighborhood ofx 1 is included in αf 1 (R 1α R −1 ), note that any ray [y] in a neighborhood of [x 1 ] intersects with G 1 (R −1 ) once at the most because of strategy-proofness and, hence, G 1 (R −1 ) is at most L − 1 dimensional.
